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The political origins of Russia’s ‘culture wars’ 
 
 
A sort of introduction 
On 11 April 2014 a large banner was hung from the façade of the Dom knigi 
(House of books) building in central Moscow. Dom knigi is one of Moscow’s 
largest bookshops on the Novyi Arbat, a major thoroughfare, and is a ten-
minute walk from the Kremlin. The banner did not stay up for long, but it 
raised the ire of liberal Russia when photographs of it were put up on the 
website of Ekho Moskvy, the talk radio station that is one of the few remaining 
independent mass media outlets in Russia, and that has offices opposite Dom 
knigi.1 The reason for liberal outrage was that the banner was titled ‘The fifth 
column. Aliens are among us’. Putin had used the term ‘fifth column’ a few 
weeks previously when he had made his speech to the Russian parliament 
before signing into law Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The outside world, 
Putin had argued, had a choice to make in Russia. It could either support 
Russia as it sought to develop and build, or it could support the ‘ the actions of 
a fifth column – a disparate bunch of “national traitors”’.2 Now a banner was 
being put up on a major Moscow road that identified who this fifth column 
was: the banner had portraits of three opposition leaders Aleksei Navalny, Ilya 
Ponomarev and Boris Nemtsov, and of musicians Andrei Makarevich and Yuri 
Shevchuk, who had criticised the annexation of Crimea. On either side of the 
portraits were two aliens – they had the heads of the monster from the Ridley 
Scott movie – dressed in suits, one of whom was holding a briefcase that had 
on it the white looped ribbon of 2011-2012 election protests, when protesters 
wore white ribbons – which Putin notoriously compared to used condoms – 
labelled Za Rossiyu bez Putina (For a Russia without Putin). 
 The Dom knigi banner was put up by an art group, Glavplakat.ru, and 
was probably intended as a satirical act (their website criticizes ‘traitors’ but 
also satirises some of the absurdities of the campaign against the ‘fifth 
column’; it is a marked contrast to the high-tech neo-Stalinism of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘Foto dnya. Banner pro pyatuyu kolonnu na “Dom knigi”’, 
http://echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/1297880-echo/, accessed 11 April 2014. 
2 Putin, V.V. ‘Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 18 Marta 2014 goda’, 
http://kremlin.ru/news/20603, accessed 22 March 2014. 
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predatel.net (traitors.net) site, which names ‘traitors’ and encourages readers 
to turn in ‘traitors’ of their own). Satire or not the Dom knigi banner summed 
up the state of Russian politics in early 2014: Russia is in the middle of a 
culture war. This war was declared, just like the Kulturkampf of Bismarck’s 
Prussia, by the political leadership. Putin has been talking up the culture war 
since just before his re-election to a third presidential term in March 2012. 
For Putin, ‘cultural self-awareness, spiritual and moral values, and codes of 
values are an area of intense competition’. This competition is international in 
its scope. The danger to Russian values comes from without as well as from a 
‘fifth column’ within Russia. The struggle ‘to influence the worldviews of 
entire ethnic groups, the desire to subject them to one’s will, to force one’s 
system of values and beliefs upon them is an absolute reality, just like the fight 
for mineral resources that many nations, ours included, experience.’3  
 We are all aware of some of the battles in Russia’s ‘culture wars’ 
because they have been played out in the Western media. The most prominent 
story in the Western media before the Sochi Winter Olympics and the 
annexation of Crimea was the Russian law on ‘gay propaganda’, with many 
campaign groups and prominent individuals calling for the boycott of the 
Sochi games over the June 2013 law against the ‘propagation of non-
traditional sexual relations’ to minors.4 Before the June 2013 law, the main 
stories about Russia in 2012 were the arrest, trial and sentencing of members 
of Pussy Riot for their ‘punk art’ performance of their ‘Punk Prayer: Mother of 
God, Chase Putin Away’ in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow,5 
and the changes to laws on civil society NGOs in June 2012 that required any 
Russian NGOs in receipt of funding from overseas to register themselves as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Putin, V.V. ‘Vstrecha s predstavitelyami obshchestvennosti po voprosam patrioticheskogo 
vospitaniya molodyozhi. 12 sentyabrya 2012 goda’, http://news.kremlin.ru/news/16470, 
accessed 7 April 2014. My thanks to Gulnaz Sharafutdinova for pointing me towards this 
source. 
4 ‘GD prinyala zakon ob ysilenii nakazaniya za propagandu gomoseksualizma sredi 
podrostkov’, http://goo.gl/vpdhH8, accessed 14 June 2013. 
5 A video with English subtitles of the lyrics of the ‘prayer’ can be found at 
http://goo.gl/vSBTCb, accessed 12 December 2013. 
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‘foreign agents’.6 Although the battles of Russia’s ‘culture wars’ are well known 
we have less understanding of why Putin launched them. Why did Russian 
politics take a ‘cultural turn’, as Richard Sakwa has called it,7 in 2011 and 
2012? One answer to this is that the ‘cultural turn’ did not come out of 
nowhere, that there were elements of it in earlier Putin administrations. 
Indeed, conservative traditionalism was present in Putinism from the very 
start. In his major public statement when he became acting President when 
Boris Yeltsin resigned, Russia on the eve of the millennium, Putin had argued 
that ‘Another foothold for the unity of Russian society is what can be called 
the traditional values of Russians. … If we lose patriotism and national pride 
and dignity, which are connected with it, we will lose ourselves as a nation 
capable of great achievements.’8 Later in his first term as president, the idea of 
‘sovereign democracy’ that Putin’s advisors promoted argued that Russia’s 
democratic standards were not comparable to those proposed by ‘universal’ 
(i.e., Western) conceptions of democracy.9  
Tracing the lineage of the ‘cultural turn’ through Putin’s speeches and 
the arguments for his rule that his apologists have produced does not tell us 
why these themes were so much more important from 2011, however. This 
leads to a second answer: we might posit the development of a more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 ‘Zakonoproekt No. 102766-6. О vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nie zakonodatel’nie akty 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v chasti regulirovaniya deyatel’nosti nekommercheskikh organizatsii, 
vypolnyayushchikh funktsii inostrannogo agenta’, http://goo.gl/suqhhx, accessed 12 
December 2013. Changes to the laws on registrations of NGOs were passed in 2012 but only 
began to be enforced after Putin called for enforcement at a meeting with the FSB, the 
internal security service in February 2014. Putin’s reasoning was straight out of the ‘culture 
war’ playbook: ‘no one has a monopoly on the right to speak on behalf of the Russian society, 
especially not those structures that are directed and financed from abroad, and that inevitably 
serve foreign interests.’ ‘Zasedanie kollegi Federal’noi sluzhby bezapasnosti. 14 fevralya 2013 
goda’, http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/17516, accessed 17 February 2013. 
7 Sakwa, R. ‘Can Putinism solve its contradictions?’ Open Democracy, 27 December 2013, 
http://goo.gl/fqaLxr, accessed 5 January 2014. 
8 Putin, V.V. ‘Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletii. Programmnaya stat’ya Predsedatelya 
Pravitel’stva Rossii, opublikovannaya na sayte kabineta ministrov RF 30 dekabrya 1999 goda’, 
in Plan Prezidenta Putina. Rukovodstvo dlya budushchikh presidentov Rossii, Moscow, 
Evropa, 2007, p.321. 
9 The idea was most associated with Vladislav Surkov, First Deputy to the Head of the 
Presidential Administration between 1999 and 2011. See Surkov, V.Yu.. Suverenitet – eto 
politicheskii sinonim konkurentosposobnosti. Moscow: Lenand, 2006; Osnovnye tendentsii i 
perspektivy razvitiya sovremennoi Rossii. Moscow: Sovremennaya gumanitarnaya 
akademiya, 2006; ‘Russkaya politicheskaya kul’tura. Vzglyad iz utopia’,http://goo.gl/A5wrQo, 
accessed 25 August 2007. For critical accounts see Kazantsev, A. ‘"Suverennaya demokratiya": 
struktura i sotsial’no-politicheskie funktsii kontsentsii’, Forum noveishei 
vostochnoevropeiskoi istorii i kul´tury, 2007, 4, 1; Mäkinen, S. ‘Surkovian narrative on the 
future of Russia: making Russia a world leader, Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics, 2011, 27, 2. 
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reactionary politics in Russia as an effort to recreate an electoral majority 
during the 2011-2012 electoral cycle.10 This electoral cycle saw the end of the 
successful formula that Putin and United Russia had used in elections from 
2003 to 2008. These elections had been won on the back of two things: the 
provision of political stability and, more importantly, the delivery of economic 
growth and rising living standards.11 The economic downturn that hit Russia 
in late 2008 and the mixed response to this by the regime weakened the 
eudaemonic legitimation of the regime since there was a perception, at least 
amongst many urban dwelling members of the new Russian middle class, that 
the Putin ‘model’ of economic management could no longer guarantee either 
their or the country’s economic fortunes.12 Disillusion with regime and the 
economic model was compounded by the delayed decision over who would 
run for president in 2012, by the perceived arrogance with which Putin moved 
the ‘reformist’ Medvedev aside from the presidency to return to the office 
himself, and by a general dislike for the ruling party of power, United Russia, 
as the partiya zhulikov i vorov (‘party of crooks and thieves’), the label given 
it by anti-corruption blogger and political activist Alexei Navalny in February 
2011 that stuck to it through the electoral year of 2011, and that was reinforced 
by people’s experience of electoral corruption in the 2011 Duma elections. 
Economic downturn and disenchantment plus dissatisfaction with United 
Russia and with the style of Putin’s return to the presidency created the toxic 
atmosphere that brought people on to the streets across the country, but most 
notably in the large demonstrations in Moscow against electoral fraud in 
December 2011. These demonstrations threatened the smooth running of the 
Medvedev-Putin handover. Although it was beyond doubt that Putin would 
win the presidency, it was not a given that he would do so in the first round of 
the elections, or at least not a given that his margin of victory in a first round 
would be greatly over the 50% victory margin. The protests over electoral 
fraud in December 2011 showed the dangers of overly blatant election rigging, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  Smyth, R. and I. Soboleva, ‘Looking beyond the economy: Pussy Riot and the Kremlin’s 
voting coalition, Post-Soviet Affairs, 2013, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.865940. 
11 McAllister, I. and S. White, ‘”It’s the Economy, Comrade!” Parties and voters in the 2007 Russian 
Duma election’, Europe-Asia Studies 2008, 60, 6. 
12 Robinson, N. ‘Russia’s response to crisis: the paradoxes of success’, Europe-Asia Studies, 2013, 65, 
3. 
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dangers that the Kremlin was probably mindful of, having seen how electoral 
fraud could be a spur to protest in Ukraine during the Orange revolution.  
The response from the Kremlin was to firm up the Putin vote by 
concentrating on a core of Putin supporters and turning the presidential 
elections into a ‘loyalty to Russia’ test. The Putin campaign was summed up by 
his giant electoral rally at the Luzhniki stadium; this was held on February 23, 
the ‘Day of the Defenders of the Fatherland’, the rally’s slogan was ‘Defend 
Russia’, and the theme of Putin’s address was that the rally and the election 
were about ‘people like us. … We are prepared to work for the good of the 
Motherland ... [we will not allow others to] dictate their will to us, since we 
have a will of our own’, and ended with a rallying call ‘The battle for Russia 
continues, we will win’.13 This campaign theme was aimed not only at rallying 
Putin voters to the flag, but was also a pre-emptive move against further 
protest. It contrasted Putin - as defender of a form of Russianness – with the 
opposition, which were portrayed as metropolitan and ‘cosmopolitan’, in 
order to disarm potential protesters, and provide grounds for the repression of 
opposition if it became necessary. Putin had already held the USA – and the 
then Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, in person – responsible for the 
December 2011 election protests during a meeting of the All-Russian People’s 
Front.14 The themes from these protests – foreign agents, existential threats to 
Russia etc., – were then carried over into post-election politics.  
The electoral explanation for ‘cultural turn’ only captures one 
dimension of this ‘turn’. It does not tell us much about how this turn fits with 
the wider issues of governing Russia, and why it has endured and 
strengthened in the period after the elections. To unravel these questions we 
have to see how the ‘cultural turn’ was a response to the weaknesses that the 
events of 2011-2012 exposed in the management of the Russian political 
system more generally. This in turn requires us to have some idea of what 
kind of political system Russia has. There is no consensus on this, but rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Gazeta.ru, ‘Putin vystupil pered narodom v “Luzhnikakh”:  “Bitva za Rossiyu prodolzhaetsya 
– pobeda za nami”’, http://goo.gl/YU97Vf, 23 February 2012, accessed 25 February 2012, 
and, ITAR-TASS, ‘Putin thanks Luzhniki rally participants for support’, 23 February 2012, 
http://goo.gl/pHsKLq, accessed 25 February 2012 
14 Elder, M.  ‘Vladimir Putin accuses Hillary Clinton of encouraging Russian protests’, The 
Guardian, 8 December 2011, http://goo.gl/qv2yfh, accessed 12 January 2012. 
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than rehearse the pro’s and con’s of the various labels that have been attached 
to Russia I will just frame the argument in terms of the label that I think fits 
best, neo-patrimonialism. Neo-patrimonialism is inherently unstable as a 
socio-political form. The crisis of 2011-2012 was part of a wider crisis of 
Russian neo-patrimonialism, which began with the economic crisis of 2008-
2009, and this wider crisis raised the prospect of an exit from neo-
patrimonialism. Even though this prospect was tentative and politically 
stillborn, it made it necessary to develop a set of broader arguments for 
stability to re-establish some order in the Russian neo-patrimonial system. 
The ‘cultural turn’ does this by creating a particular rhetoric of reaction. This 
rhetoric of reaction, a term is being borrowed from Albert Hirschman (and 
some of the categories that Hirschman identified as common to reactionary 
rhetoric will be used later),15 narrows the range of possible political action that 
can, from the regime’s point of view, be ‘legitimate’, whilst at the same time 
not proscribing the basic structures of economic and political management 
that have been used under Putin since 2000. The cultural turn, the drawing 
out of what is imagined to be the distinctiveness of Russia and Russian 
civilization in comparison to the ‘West’ and to Europe in particular, has thus 
contracted the possible solutions to neo-patrimonialism in Russia so that 
Putin’s electoral advantage has turned into a form of political stagnation. 
 
Neo-patrimonialism and instability 
 
The concept of neo-patrimonialism is resurgent in post-Soviet studies.16 The 
attraction of using the term is that it is a broader description of hybridity than 
terms such as electoral authoritarianism. Concepts like electoral 
authoritarianism look at hybridity at regime level only. They look at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Hirschman, A. The rhetoric of reaction. Perversity, futility, jeopardy, Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press, 1991. 
16 It has particularly been used to describe Central Asia, for an overview see, Isaacs, R.  
‘Neopatrimonialism and beyond: reassessing the formal and informal in the study of Central Asian 
Politics’, Contemporary Politics, forthcoming 2014. In the last few years it has been used with more 
frequency to talk about Russia, cf. Hale, H. ‘Eurasian polities as hybrid regimes: The case of Putin’s 
Russia’, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2010, 1, 1; Hanson, S. ‘Plebiscitarian patrimonialism in Putin’s 
Russia: legitimating authoritarianism in a postideological era’, The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, 2011, 636; Lynch, A. How Russia is not ruled. Reflections on Russian 
political development, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 159-63; Robinson, N. Russia. A 
state of uncertainty, London, Routledge, 2002. On the concept and post-Soviet politics generally see 
Fisun, A. ‘Postsovetskie neopatrimonal’nie rezhimi: genezis, osobennosti, tipologia’, Otechestvennye 
Zapiski, 2007, 6, 39. 
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tension between accessing power through elections and ruling through 
authoritarian practices and are overwhelmingly concerned with the prospect 
of regime change and the issue of whether electoral or competitive democracy 
will replace electoral or competitive authoritarianism. Neo-patrimonialism is 
concerned with hybridity at a broader level than regime politics; it recognizes 
that there are multiple tensions within a polity at regime and state levels, and 
also between them.  
Neo-patrimonialism does not describe a particular institutional order 
as hybrid like electoral authoritarianism do, or a definite state of affairs within 
a polity in terms of rights and obligations of citizens, arrangements of social 
groups or economy, levels of democracy or autocracy. The core of a neo-
patrimonial system is that within it patrimonialism, personal claims to power, 
ties and relations, is complemented, complicated and conflicted by impersonal 
institutions, which have some existence independent of individual political 
actors. These impersonal institutions are most notably a bureaucratic state 
machinery, the development of which pushes a part of the state away from 
personal relations toward more enduring hierarchies based on impersonalism; 
and impersonal market economic exchange, which adds additional channels 
to wealth to the personalised access to resources through the machinery of a 
state constructed around its leader(s). Neo-patrimonialism is thus a politico-
economic system that is made up of conflicting modes of organization and 
domination, and their legitimation, rather than a particular institutional, 
social or economic order.17 How and in what combination these conflicting 
modes of organization and domination, and their justification are co-joined, 
and what leads to their conjunction, is a matter of material conditions and 
pressures, but also of political choice and organization. This means that neo-
patrimonial systems can contain a wide range of personalised and formal 
institutions, of patronage and bureaucratic hierarchy, and of particularistic 
economic exchange in which access to resources is influenced by personal ties 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Médard, J-F.  ‘The underdeveloped state in Tropical Africa: political clientelism or neo-
patrimonialism?’ in Clapham, C. (ed.) Private patronage and public power, London, Francis Pinter, 
1982; Erdmann, G. and U. Engel, ‘Neopatrimonialism revisited – beyond a catch-all concept’, 
Hamburg: GIGA Working Papers, 2006, 16. 
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Figure 1 The neo-patrimonial space 
 
    
 
Bureaucratic 
impersonalism 
Developmental 
authoritarianism    
Developmental 
democracy 
      
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
 
 
 
Neo- 
patrimonialism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Main 
principle of 
political 
organization 
      
  
Personalism 
 
Patrimonialism 
   Patrimonial 
capitalism  
   
Politically 
controlled 
economy 
 
    
Market 
exchange 
  Main principle of economic organization 
 
Adapted from Robinson, N. ‘Institutional factors and Russian political parties: the 
changing needs of regime consolidation in a neo-patrimonial system’, Eastern 
European Politics, 2012, 28, 3, p.301. 
_______________________ 
 
and relational capital is of paramount importance, and impersonal market 
economic exchange and organization where access to resources is more open 
and influenced by impersonal considerations. 
Since it does not have a particular set of institutional or organizational 
forms, neo-patrimonialism is best conceived as a space in which rulers try to 
ensure the continuity of their power. Figure 1 maps out the space that neo-
patrimonialism occupies between personal and impersonal modes of political 
legitimation, and between closed, personal access to economic wealth and 
more open, impersonal market forms. Neo-patrimonial polities may take 
different political and economic institutional forms within this space 
according to their particular combination of different organizing and 
legitimating principles and forms of domination. What unites neo-patrimonial 
systems is not any common institutional design but the fact that first, the 
combination of patrimonial with bureaucratic forms of organization, of 
personalism with impersonalism, means that within them regime (essentially 
the rules that manage access to power) and state (the institutional locus of 
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power) as forms of domination are not easily reconciled, and second, and 
because of this, there is a high degree of uncertainty about the future. The 
rules on access to power – the regime – are essentially personalistic, although 
they may exist alongside what should be impersonal rules on accessing power 
where there are organizational structures like political parties or some 
constitutional requirement for elections. The existence of such impersonal 
rules for accessing power alongside a personalist system may complicate the 
consolidation of a stable regime. A regime is consolidated and stable when 
elites achieve a set of rules on accessing power that they cannot change 
without incurring a disproportionate cost to themselves. The existence of 
impersonal rules on accessing power alongside personalism influences the 
cost of trying to change how power can be accessed and by whom since such 
rules can create avenues for contesting who holds power, and can give 
opportunities to develop broader supporting constituencies for a challenge to 
personalism than can be developed through personalist patronage networks. 
This creates uncertainty over how power can be accessed and held onto. This 
uncertainty is compounded by the fact that in the neo-patrimonial space 
predominately personalist politics exist alongside and are interwoven with 
larger administrative systems that have features of a modern bureaucratic 
state. This state (including those personalist political actors who are its 
functionaries) has to perform wider functions than just satisfying the needs of 
the ruling group or groups and simply securing their hold on power by 
providing external security and suppressing domestic opposition (although it 
does that too). It has to provide some level of welfare to the wider population, 
either through redistribution or by securing some acceptable level of economic 
activity and perhaps growth. This has two implications.  
First, the state’s essential legitimation and form of domination are 
impersonal. It has to have some autonomy from private interests, or at least 
be able to claim to have such autonomy, in order to perform its functions and 
provide security and welfare, whether that welfare be in the from of 
redistribution or provision of an environment that enables economic growth. 
Developing such autonomy requires that the state can claim that its 
operations are rational-legal, rather than personal and particularistic, since its 
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provision of welfare and security have to be justified as serving common 
interests rather than private ends.  
Second, the development of the state is a more complicated process 
than the creation of a regime. A regime may be consolidated, as we have said, 
where elites achieve a set of rules on accessing power that they cannot change 
without incurring a disproportionate cost to themselves. State building is 
consolidated when officials have the ability and resources to perform state 
functions of maintaining order and security. The consolidation of a state is 
thus a far more difficult thing to achieve than the consolidation of a regime 
since managing the classic state functions of social order and national security 
involves questions of borders, citizenship, and the establishment of new forms 
of economic exchange and rules to govern them. A regime may be 
consolidated before a state develops that can resolve the problems of post-
communist reconstruction and fulfil the classic functions of a state easily.  
If this occurs, the question before a regime is can it contain and 
ameliorate the problems of reconstruction and maintaining social order and 
national security in such a way that it can survive ruling through a weak state 
(i.e., one that cannot resolve post-communist transformation or traditional 
state tasks)? If a regime cannot contain or ameliorate the pressure to build-up 
the state some other way (for example by gaining aid or security guarantees 
from other states) then it will come under pressure to evolve further so as to 
facilitate the development of the state, to compensate for the weakness of that 
development, or to find new ways to substitute itself for state development. 
Where this pressure exists and is not responded to the long-term viability of a 
regime will be open to question. The viability of a regime in these 
circumstances may be called to question from below or from within the state 
as pressure to take action, or to reduce in someway the problem that in other 
polities be dealt with through a stronger state, grows in reaction to perceived 
threats to the interests of state officials and to their ability to perform basic 
state functions of maintaining order and security. Regime members may try to 
fix access to power and resources through agreements with one another. 
However, they cannot be certain that they can maintain the arrangements that 
they make or the power bases that allow them to make these arrangements, 
since the state might encroach on these power bases (such as patronage 
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networks) in order to fulfil its functions (by curtailing corruption, for example, 
in order to improve state revenues that can be used for social consumption). 
Uncertainty for regime members is heightened by the fact that they cannot 
always be clear what the motive is behind any encroachment on their 
arrangements. The interleaving of regime members and their clients through 
the administrative system means that it is hard to discern what is a move to 
increase the functionality of the state and what is a power grab by some other 
elite group or member. Likewise, state officials interested in working to fulfil 
the state’s functions cannot be sure that they will be able to do so without 
encountering some regime member’s interests and opposition, that there will 
be the resources to complete their tasks, or that their actions won’t be seen as 
hostile to some powerbroker even when they are not. 
Political development in a neo-patrimonial system is shaped by the 
difficulty of producing a functional relationship between regime and state, and 
the high degree of uncertainty that this produces. Much of the literature on 
change and neo-patrimonialism is concerned with how the state-
regime/formal-informal tensions can lead to collapse and to regime change.18 
This is the extreme end of change in a neo-patrimonial system, however, and 
should not lead us to ignore the fact that neo-patrimonial systems are always 
struggling to manage the tensions that they contain. Tension in the 
development of a neo-patrimonial polity is, crudely, over first, whether a 
regime can be consolidated through elite agreement, and second, whether a 
regime can develop enough state functionality, or be able act as a substitute 
for the state, sufficient to provide for security and deal with pressure to deliver 
welfare. The uncertainties of neo-patrimonialism mean that there will always 
be competing interests within the neo-patrimonial polity that will seek to push 
it towards one of the four corners of Figure 1 to manage the uncertainty that is 
characteristic of the neo-patrimonial space. Regime formation and its stability 
can contain these tensions by making the costs of acting to reduce uncertainty 
to high for a group, but over the longer term there also needs to be state 
functionality, or regime substitution for a functional state formation, to insure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For example, Bratton, M. and N. van de Walle, ‘Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in 
Africa’, World Politics, 1994, 46, 4. 
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neo-patrimonial system stability and so that any exogenous shocks that neo-
patrimonial regimes are not very good at dealing with, can be contained.  
If a stable relationship between regime and state formation does not 
develop it is an open question of which of the forms of domination in neo-
patrimonialism will shape its development. Will the personalist, patrimonial 
regime increasingly dominate state and market, or will impersonal 
bureaucratic or market structures moderate personalism? In the terms 
outlined in Figure 1, the choice is roughly between moving up to the top of the 
figure, to a position where state dominates regime, or moving down to the 
bottom of the Figure, to a system where regime dominates state. If the former 
it may be possible to reduce uncertainty for state officials so that the state can 
become ‘developmental’, concerned with the provision of economic growth for 
a wider spectrum of society, rather than constrained by elite interests. If the 
latter the result will be personalist political power and/or elite control over the 
market that limits economic distribution through the state and the wider 
functionality of the state in favour of satisfying particular interests. 
Movement in any of these directions, and even contradictory 
movements, is always possible as a neo-patrimonial system tries to deal with 
pressures for change. Sources of change can be exogenous or endogenous. 
External actors such as international organizations might, for example assert 
pressure on a neo-patrimonial polity by insisting on greater respect for 
impersonal electoral rules, or insist in the adoption and enforcement of 
policies (such as competition policies) that circumscribe elite rent-seeking. 
Similar pressures might come from within the neo-patrimonial polity as a 
result of elite conflict, social pressure, or because, and there is some need to 
develop state capacity (by building up revenue for example) that requires 
some alteration in the relationship between patrimonial political structures 
and agents, and functional bureaucratic state. These pressures need to be 
managed so that they are not destructive of neo-patrimonial stability or so 
that such destruction is handled in a way that enables a peaceable movement 
from the neo-patrimonial space to one of the corners of Figure 1. Getting out 
of the neo-patrimonial space to a corner of Figure 1 will mean a decrease in 
uncertainty about the future for some leader, faction, element of the state 
bureaucracy, or social group. There will be leaders and factions who seek to 
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maximise their patronage and personal powers at a cost to the wider state, 
and leaders, factions and bureaucrats who want to constrain particularistic 
interests to push development towards some political end or have 
development steered by market rationality so as to increase the state’s 
functionality, its ability to deliver security and welfare. There will also be 
social groups who support these leaders and their ideas in the hope that they 
might deliver economic growth, redistribution, or opportunity. There are thus, 
at least potentially, wide and diverse political and economic interests at work 
within a neo-patrimonial polity. Stability in a neo-patrimonial system requires 
that none of these interests gain too much leverage to enact its project and 
move the polity out of the neo-patrimonial space to one of the corners of 
Figure 1. What movement towards the corners of Figure 1 would entail is 
sketched out in Figure 2. This gives an abstracted overview of what forces 
might seek to move in which direction, what such a movement would entail 
and what it might require minimally to be a successful movement to some 
form of developmental state, to some form of ‘traditional’ patrimonialism as 
originally described by Weber (bottom left of Figure 1), or to what 
Schlumberger has called patrimonial capitalism (bottom right of Figure 1), 
where market instruments are adopted, usually because of external pressures, 
but the terms on which these instruments work are set by local elites who 
subvert them to their material advantage.19 
Delineating these interests and pressures conceptually, even if they 
may be indivisible in reality in any particular neo-patrimonial system, can 
help us appreciate the essential contradictions of neo-patrimonial systems, the 
problems that they have aligning different forms of domination, the 
compromises between regime politics that are highly personalised and the 
existence of a bureaucratic state and formal constitutional structures, and the 
difficulties involved overcoming these compromises. Not all of these interests 
and pressures need exist within a neo-patrimonial system, or if they do exist 
they may do so in combination with one another. Political leaders might move  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Weber, M. The theory of social and economic organization, New York, The Free Press, 1947, 622-
49; Schlumberger, O. ‘Structural reform, economic order, and development: patrimonial capitalism’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 2008, 15, 4. 
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Figure 2 Exits from the neo-patrimonial space 
 Actors and 
motivation 
Process Conditions for 
‘successful move’ 
Movement 
toward 
patrimonialism 
Leader and/or elite 
faction seek sees 
possibility of supplanting 
other leaders and/or 
elite groups to become 
hegemonic. May be 
opportunistic or to 
resolve contest for power 
and achieve security of 
tenure 
Suppression or co-option 
of elite groups by core 
ruling group/leader; 
 
Hollowing out of state 
and attenuation of 
market mechanisms in 
favour of personal 
political and economic 
control. 
Low level or containable 
demands from society on 
state so that the 
hollowing out of formal 
bureaucracy by personal 
rule does not create a 
societal backlash; 
 
Private economic 
interests weakened so 
that they can be co-opted 
into personal rule or 
marginalized. 
Movement 
toward 
patrimonial 
capitalism 
 
Leader and/or elite 
faction seek economic 
advantage through 
economic liberalization. 
May be due to exogenous 
pressure and/or 
response to failure of 
economic management. 
 
Economic management 
through state replaced by 
market mechanisms that 
operate only insofar as 
they do not gainsay elite 
interests; 
 
Elite secures control of 
commanding heights of 
the economy and secures 
rents through politically 
sheltered private 
economic activity. 
 
Low level or containable 
demands from society on 
state and market so that 
the development of 
market in favour of elite 
does not create a societal 
backlash; 
 
Contest over state 
resources as 
liberalization unfolds 
does not lead to 
unmanageable elite 
conflict. 
Movement to 
developmental 
authoritarianism 
 
Leader and/or elite 
faction seek to force pace 
of economic 
development through 
increased bureaucratic 
control of economy. May 
be in response to state 
crisis/social pressure for 
growth. 
 
 
Suppression of private 
economic activity and 
autonomy, in particular 
in areas such as 
investment, in favour of 
bureaucratic direction; 
 
Politicised (‘ideological’) 
notion of development 
established as basis for 
bureaucratic autonomy 
from some elite interests. 
Societal and elite 
demands for resources 
either through 
investment in favoured 
projects or welfare 
largely ignored by 
bureaucracy so that 
particularistic interests 
should be constrained; 
 
State develops capacity 
to control social and elite 
backlash against curbs 
on consumption required 
to fund development. 
 
Movement to 
developmental 
democracy 
Leader and/or elite 
faction seek to force pace 
of economic 
development through 
combination of 
bureaucratic 
management of the 
economy and private 
economic activity. May 
be in response to state 
crisis/social pressure for 
growth, likely to be 
backed by exogenous 
pressure. 
 
 
Development of 
bureaucratic capacity 
and autonomy from most 
private elite interests; 
 
Changing composition of 
elite as market 
empowers new actors; 
 
Develop claim that 
administration of 
economy is through 
neutral rational-legality 
rather than ideology. 
Societal and elite 
demands for resources 
either through 
investment in favoured 
projects or welfare 
largely ignored by 
bureaucracy so that 
particularistic interests 
should be constrained; 
 
State develops capacity 
to control social and elite 
backlash against changes 
in allocation of resources 
that marketization 
produces. 
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from one position to another or attempt to combine elements of them as they 
try to both reduce their current uncertainty and secure their future over the 
longer term. This will reproduce neo-patrimonialism and its uncertainties 
either through a stop-start process of political and economic development, or 
because no clear direction of movement can appear and the neo-patrimonial 
system muddles through. 
 
 
Neo-patrimonial instability in Russian politics 
 
Russia’s development as a neo-patrimonial system was contingent on its 
Soviet heritage and post-Soviet aspirations. Neither formal nor informal 
institutions and patterns of domination have been able supplant the other so 
that Russia remained within the neo-patrimonial space. Uncertainty about the 
future has therefore been a constant of Russia’s post-communist experience, 
although this uncertainty was moderated for a time in the 2000s by the 
consolidation of the regime and its substitution for state functionality. There 
is not the space here to go through all the twists and turns of the development 
of neo-patrimonialism in Russia, but we can map out the main direction of 
development.  
 The Soviet Union had a particularly patrimonial form of communism, 
where personalism and clientelism significantly, and simultaneously, 
undercut and supported the formal bureaucratic hierarchies of the party-
state,20 Russia should have become a democratic developmental state based 
on bureaucratic impersonalism and market organization if it had managed to 
change as market reformers had initially intended. However it did not have 
either of the conditions listed in Figure 2 for making such a move. The state 
could not constrain particularistic interests by ignoring societal and elite 
demands for resources either through investment in favoured projects or 
welfare, and the state did not have and could not develop the capacity to 
control social and elite reactions to changes in resource allocation that 
marketization should have produced. At the same time there was no force that 
could move Russia to any of the other exits from the neo-patrimonial space 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 On communism as a form of patrimonialism, see Kitschelt, H. Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markovski and G. 
Toka, Post-communist party systems: competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp.21-24.  
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described in Figures 1 and 2. Social demands for welfare and the entrenched 
power of economic interests meant that there was no chance of moving to 
either developmental authoritarianism, that was blocked by the power of local 
economic interests that had de facto privatised much of Russia’s economy at 
the end of the perestroika period, or to some form of patrimonialism, which 
would have undercut the state so that it could not deal with social needs. 
Structural and political factors therefore meant that reform and state building 
could never be fully completed or compromised, but at the same time the 
failings of reform meant that the state building was undermined by 
informality. El’tsin coped with the failure to break out of the neo-patrimonial 
space through compromise and the development of his personal power as 
arbiter between elite factions.21 This weakened state capacity and bureaucratic 
autonomy as the incorporation of elite factions into the administration created 
overlapping institutions at the centre so that there were no clear lines of 
authority or responsibility in central government administration and policy 
making,22 and led to the fragmentation of the national politico-administrative 
space as regional elites structured local political systems to their own 
advantage.23 
The weakening of state capacity had limits, however, so that there was 
never a drift to full patrimonialism. Personal and informal politics weakened 
the state and its functionality, but strong pressures to preserve something of 
its functionality meant that it could not be hollowed out completely to become 
just a vehicle for the private interests of elite members. These pressures had 
multiple sources. In part they were structural and Soviet era legacies. State 
functionality had to be maintained to some degree because of the security 
needs of the Russian state; the Russian state could not be reduced to a simple 
coercive shell that protected a rapacious elite through domestic repression 
since it has been faced with multiple foreign policy and security problems, 
such as dealing with its position as a hegemon in the post-Soviet space, which 
require the preservation of state capacity. Social expectations have also called 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kuvaldin, V. (1998) ‘Presidentsvo v kontekste rossiiskoe transformatsii’, in Shevtsova, L. (ed.) 
Rossiya politicheskaya, Moscow, Carnegie Endowment, 1998; Breslauer, G. Gorbachev and Yeltsin as 
leaders, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002 
22 Huskey, E. Presidential power in Russia, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1999. 
23 Gel’man, V. and T. Lankina, ‘Authoritarian versus democratic diffusions: explaining institutional 
choices in Russia’s local government’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 2008, 24, 1. 
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for some continuation of state capacity. These expectations were both 
domestic and international. Internationally, the idea held by many Russians 
that Russia should be ‘great’ has required state capacity, so that structural 
pressures to react to foreign policy problems is socially reinforced. 
Domestically, Russia could not fully amend Soviet era welfare policies, many 
of which required state provision and regulation. This is not, of course, to say 
that the Russian state dealt with either security or welfare issues well or 
effectively. The point is that even though access to power became increasingly 
to lay through personal ties under both El’tsin and Putin there was never a 
complete compromise of the state and its functions.  
Crisis and political developments from the 1990s never fundamentally 
changed the balance that had developed regime and state because, as Russia 
lurched from crisis to crisis, the tendency was for alignment of the needs of 
power holders with some requirements for state development so that Russia’s 
position in the neo-patrimonial space was managed and reproduced. This was 
because developing state capacity has also been a way of securing personal 
rule for all of Russia’s presidents. Consequently the development of 
personalist patterns of domination has not been separated in practice from 
the extension of notions of bureaucratic and state autonomy. We can see this, 
for example, in the moves made by El’tsin in the 1997 to restore state finances. 
Reform of the tax system and development of state capacity to collect tax in 
1997 was designed to secure revenue for the state so that it could continue to 
perform the weak social management functions that it was engaged in (Easter, 
2102, 138). Enacting this reform required a restructuring of government so 
that the state could become more autonomous of powerful social interests, 
something that El’tsin highlighted as a problem in his 1997 state of the union 
address. The restructuring of the government should have weakened 
oligarchic interests and increased El’tsin’s power since the new government 
contained more economic liberals, and they were dependent on El’tsin’s 
patronage because of their lack of a social support base. This worked to 
counterbalance the authority of the Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
and made the government more dependent on El’tsin at a time when his 
authority had been compromised by his health issues. A ‘necessary’ set of 
actions to deal with the fiscal crisis of the state and put in place revenue 
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streams that would enable it to perform its basic functions and reproduce 
itself supported personalism in the form of El’tsin’s control over elite factions, 
and vice versa was supported by personalism. There was little prospect of 
El’tsin’s actions taking Russia out of the neo-patrimonial space as a result, but 
there was, at least temporarily a rearrangement of the relationship between 
powerful factions within it so that the tensions between state and regime 
could be managed, albeit not very effectively.  
The same admixture of the patrimonial development of personal rule 
and the development of formal structures marked the development of Putin’s 
political authority after 2000. Action against oligarchs and regional leaders, 
and Putin’s efforts at developing the capacity of the Russian state through the 
reassertion of its monopoly rights over violence, developed his 
personal/patrimonial powers but was supposed to have impersonal state 
building results so that it is impossible to separate the two or see if one has 
more importance as motive than the other. The curtailment of oligarchic 
encroachment on the state that Putin ordered at his famous July 2000 
meeting with the oligarchs furthered the goal of separating the state from 
economic interests that El’tsin had raised in 1997. The limitations on the 
exercise of power by regional leaders addressed the fragmentation of the 
national political and economic space in Russia, a fragmentation that should 
also have been lessened by the development of the state’s coercive capacity. 
Western and Russian observers had identified all of these actions as necessary 
to deal with the problem that weak state authority posed for the 
democratisation of Russia in the 1990s.24  
These actions did not lead to Russia exiting the neo-patrimonial space, 
however. Putin’s actions developed the state’s coercive capacity, but this did 
not alter its capacity in other sectors to any great extent. Putin’s actions were, 
overall, another realignment of the balance of forces and interests within 
Russia’s neo-patrimonial space, rather than a break with it. The polity became 
more patrimonial as Putin more closely controlled factional conflict through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See, inter alia, Bova, R. ‘Democratization and the crisis of the Russian state’, in Smith, G. (ed.) 
State-building in Russia. The Yeltsin legacy and the challenge of the future, Armonk, NY, M.E. 
Sharpe, 1999; McFaul, M. ‘Russia’s “privatized” state as an impediment to democratic consolidation’, 
Security Dialogue, 1998, 29, 2 and 3; Mukhin, A. Biznes-elita i gosudarstvennaya vlast’: kto vladeet 
Rossiei na rubezhe vekov? Moscow, Tsentr politicheskoi informatsii, 2001; Peregrudov, S., N. Lapina 
and I. Semenenko, Gruppy interesov i rossiiskoe gosudarstvo, Moscow, Editorial URSS, 1999. 
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the presidency and because of changes to elections, something we will discuss 
below. State functionality was maintained because of economic growth and a 
closer bureaucratic management of the economy. This management of the 
economy was tied to a political vision for economic development,25 but only 
weakly, and proprietary office holding was not curtailed at all to push Russia 
towards a form of developmental authoritarianism. The encroachment of 
proprietary office holding on the commonwealth was held in check not by the 
extension or improvement of formal political mechanisms and bureaucratic 
routine, but symbolically, through Putin’s charisma. Whilst the allure of 
Putin’s charisma might be a mystery to many in the West, it was a factor in 
Russian politics as Putin was turned by Kremlin campaigns, and in parts of 
the popular imagination and culture, into the guarantor of in the final instance 
of the rectitude of the Russian state.26 There is some argument as to how far 
Putin’s popularity was a result of the promotion of his charismatic qualities, 
and good evidence to suggest that economic results were as important to 
Putin’s popularity as the promotion of his cult.27 Nevertheless, Putin’s 
character, perceived competence, and vitality have all been attractive features 
to Russia’s voters from before the Russian economy began to recover, setting 
him apart from the corruption and incompetence of the El’tsin presidency. 
This characterization of Putin was assiduously promoted both positively, 
through media campaigns that showed him as a multi-faceted man of action 
and problem solver, and by denying the oxygen of publicity to other politicians 
who might challenge Putin in terms of charisma.28 Under the umbrella of 
Putin’s charisma and his symbolic defence of the formal political order, 
increased bureaucratic management of the economy was a re-alignment of 
private and bureaucratic interests rather than a move toward more economic 
management by the state for clear developmental goals, whether democratic 
or authoritarian. Overall, developing regime strength substituted for state 
development so that the tension between state and regime lessened 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Balzer, H. ‘The Putin thesis and Russian energy policy’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 2005, 21, 3 
26 On the Putin cult see Goscilo, H. (ed) Putin as celebrity and icon, London: Routledge, 2013. 
27 Treisman, D. 'Presidential popularity in a hybrid regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin', American 
Journal of Political Science, 2011, 55, 3. 
28 Colton, T. and M. McFaul Popular choice and managed democracy. The Russian elections 
of 1999 and 2000, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2003, pp.193-6; Hill, F. and 
C. Gaddy Mr. Putin. Operative in the Kremlin, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. 
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somewhat, with social welfare provided for as a spillover from oil-fuelled 
economic development rather than as a result of state policy or better state 
management of the economy. Russia thus stayed in the neo-patrimonial space 
despite Putin’s increasing personal power and increased bureaucratic control 
over the economy. Putin, as has been mentioned, had notions of Russian 
economic development based on a more directed and statist economy, and the 
state did not develop the capacity to control elites or society more broadly to 
control consumption in favour of directed economic investment. But 
particularistic interests trumped state needs and functionality as long as their 
political loyalty was not an issue. Where it was an issue (or was claimed to be 
an issue) they were repressed and this repression was justified by appeals to 
the larger, universal needs of Russia, and using ‘legal’ means (courts and 
judicial processes). Informal and formal powers therefore backed each other 
up.29 Otherwise signs of patrimonialism such as corruption remained high, 
especially as societal checks on them from the media and civil society 
organizations were weakened as the quest for political stability saw their 
diminution. Overall, and not surprisingly, there was no improvement in the 
governance of Russia over the course of Putin’s administration. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3, which shows selected governance indicators from the  
 
Figure 3 Governance in Russia (selected World Bank Governance Indicators) 
 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?s
ource=worldwide-governance-indicators, last accessed 12 March 2014 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ledeneva, A. Can Russia modernize? Sistema, power networks and informal governance, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
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World Bank for Russia from 1996 to 2012 (the last date available). Only 
indicators for areas to do with economic governance, not political openness or 
stability are shown. The scale runs from -2.5 to 2.5; for comparisons sake a 
country like Ireland would score around between 1.3 and 1.8 on these 
measures, as would most economically advanced established liberal 
democracies. There were improvements in Russia’s governance indicators 
when the chaos of the El’tsin period ended and when Medvedev took over 
from Putin, but generally these were brief improvements and the affect of 
leadership change soon ended and governance worsened again. 
 
Only one-way out: the crisis of neo-patrimonialism and the 
‘cultural turn’ 
 
Remaining in the neo-patrimonial space meant that Russia’s stability during 
the Putin years was a façade. Underneath this façade there were political 
undercurrents that sought to push it towards one of the solutions to neo-
patrimonialism as outlined in Figure 1. There was also the possibility of the 
mismanagement of the neo-patrimonial space leading to a social reaction to 
neo-patrimonialism if people felt that it was not providing sufficient state 
functionality, or if they felt that their rights were being too grossly infringed 
upon. This was the lesson that Putin and his entourage drew from the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine in 2004: it does not take a great deal of organization to 
turn the mismanagement of part of the neo-patrimonial system into a struggle 
between the formal and informal elements of this system. The changes to the 
political and electoral system that Putin made during his first presidential 
terms headed off protest from the electoral system, controlled labour disputes 
and weakened new unions, and put in place mechanisms such as the youth 
movement Nashi to control grassroots mobilization.30 But despite these 
measures, protest remained as a latent force in Russia during 2000-2008.  
After 2008 it moved from latency to visibility as protests increased, with the 
demonstrations during the electoral cycle of 2011-2012 the final stage in this 
movement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Robertson, G. The politics of protest in hybrid regimes. Managing dissent in post-
communist Russia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
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 The reasons for this shift in protest were that the substitution of regime 
strength for state functionality became an issue after 2008, and became an 
issue in a way that ruled out a move toward democratic developmentalism. 
There were two reasons for this. First, the ‘Tandemocracy’ of Putin as Prime 
Minister and Medvedev as President after March 2008 highlighted the 
distinction between formal and actual power. Medvedev had formal power as 
President, but actual power lay with the more charismatic Putin. Second, the 
economic crisis that hit Russia in the autumn of 2008 highlighted for many 
the limited functionality of the state to build a modern economy, hemmed in 
as it was by the informal politics of the regime. On their own these issues may 
not have been too politically unsettling to the Russian neo-patrimonial 
system. But together they were politically toxic because of the way that 
Medvedev tried to move Russia toward democratic developmentalism. The 
failure of this showed the limited extent to which Russian neo-patrimonialism 
could adapt, and ruled out its adaptation towards democratic 
developmentalism. 
Medvedev had come to the presidency promising to launch a 
‘modernization’ of Russia. This promise had Putin’s support in early 2008, as 
Putin launched the policy himself with a development plan for Russia to 
2020.31 Essentially, at this point, modernization was synonymous with 
diversification of the economy away from overreliance on energy exports. 
Modernization promised a more directed role for the state in the economy, but 
this was in line with Putin’s general position that the state should aid 
development in Russia in order to make it great. There was no immediate 
threat in this to the stability of neo-patrimonialism. Putin’s development plans 
favoured existing industrial structures and allowed regional authorities to 
access off budget funds for local projects.32 Modernization thus looked a 
means of transferring resources to the existing economic structure so that it 
replicated itself and continued to provide support for the regime.33 Although 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Putin, V.V. ‘Speech at expanded meeting of the State Council on Russia’s development 
strategy through to 2020’, Johnsons’ Russia List (e-mail version), 2008, 29, 11 February 
2008. 
32 Pappe, Y. and A. Zudin, ‘Chto razvivayut “instituty razvitiya”?’, Politcom.ru. Tsentr 
politicheskikh tekhnologii, http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?Id=6708 , accessed 22 
January 2009. 
33 Makarenko, B. ‘Vozmozhna li v Rossii modenizatsiya?’ Pro et Contra, 2008, 12, 5-6. 
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this version of modernization would have required some change in the 
economic role of the state as an investor it would not have impacted existing 
interests without some compensation. Any threat to neo-patrimonialism 
would have been at some future, unknowable date, and would depend on 
modernization changing the relative economic power of sectors of the Russian 
economy.  
This was to change as the economic crisis bit. Medvedev linked the 
experience of crisis both to the structure of the economy, which had been 
Putin’s reason for introducing modernization, but also argued that dealing 
with this was a political problem that required institutional change and would 
entail a shift away from the neo-patrimonial space. Documents and proposals 
from the Institute for Contemporary Development (INSOR, seen as 
Medvedev’s think-tank) or Medvedev’s ‘Go Russia!’ or his 2010 blog on 
political reform, all linked crisis to political reform.34 Medvedev and INSOR 
argued that although ‘many crisis problems have been “extinguished” with 
money from federal budgets, their resolution had been set to one side. The 
result is a provisional stabilisation without modernisation; the crisis cannot 
break through institutional barriers’.35 The solution to this was to enact 
political reform that would increase the state’s capacity to regulate the market 
neutrally. Medvedev and INSOR’s proposals all argued for a move towards a 
developmental state based on bureaucratic impersonalism and market 
exchange. The three conditions for successful modernization, INSOR argued, 
were first, improving democracy to reduce ‘policy mistakes’ and avoid the 
‘catastrophic’ risks that are often associated with authoritarian modernization 
policies. Second, improving Russia’s ‘human capital’, which would involve not 
just better public goods provision but a ‘dialogue with "consumers", recording 
their objective interests and subjective evaluations of social justice’, so as to 
avoid the kind of social protests that had followed top-down reforms such as 
the efforts to ‘monetize’ benefits in 2005. And third, a freeing of business and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 INSOR Rossiya XXI veka: obraz zhelaemogo zavtra, Moscow: Institut sovremennogo 
razvitiya, 2010; INSOR Оbretenie budushchego. Strategiya 2012, Moscow: Moscow: Institut 
sovremennogo razvitiya, 2011; Medvedev, D.  ‘Rossiya, vpered!’ http://kremlin.ru/news/5413, 
2009, accessed 13 December 2011; Medvedev, D.  ‘Nasha demokratiya nesovershenna, my eto 
prekrasno ponimaem. Zapis’ v bloge Dmitriya Medvedeva posvyashchena razvitiyu Rossiiskoi 
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‘citizen activism’ from bureaucratic interference, whether from ‘above’ or from 
corruption from below. Securing these changes to effect institutional reform 
would, it was recognized, involve conflict. Moving resources from commodity 
sales from consumption to investment would impact rent-seeking and 
proprietary office holding. The conflict of bureaucratic particularistic interest 
with general social interest would have to be ended by institutional change 
and the imposition of the rule of law, and were a matter of political will.36 
Medvedev’s ideas never gained traction within the political system. 
Although parts of the Russian elite may have been favour of them, there was 
no groundswell of support for them so that the costs of pursuing them were 
clearly high. Putin stayed largely above the political debate on Medvedev’s 
proposals. This may have been because he did not support them, although he 
did express support for the general goals of economic diversification, or 
because he wanted to see how much support they had before committing 
himself to them. Either way, his quietude on the issue of political change 
supporting economic development increased the sense that there was no 
consensus on change so that pursuing it was going to have uncertain pay-offs. 
The contrast between the bureaucratic rationality that underpinned the 
Medvedev proposals looked to many as though they were a challenge to the 
charismatic foundations of Putin’s popularity and authority. Institutional 
reform, in other words, looked like a challenge to Putin because it would 
relocate the guarantee of political rectitude away from the person of Putin and 
try to vest it in legality and rational-legal practice. Supporting Medvedev 
therefore looked to many as if it were a challenge to Putin as he attempted to 
create a political personality of his own in what was seen by many as a ‘silent 
war’ with Putin and the control that he exercised informally over the factions 
within the Russian polity.37 This heightened uncertain over the prospects of 
Medvedev’s policies from within the Russian political system. If, as it looked, 
support for Medvedev meant a challenge to Putin the costs of support would 
be immediate because of Putin’s control over informal politics and were 
calculable (the fate of previous within-system challengers to Putin was a 
known). The benefits of supporting Medvedev were very much in the future, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 INSOR Rossiya XXI veka, pp.10-12. 
37 Sakwa, R. The crisis of Russian democracy. The dual state, factionalism and the Medvedev 
succession, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp.346,-8 
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and potentially meant a loss of access to resources needed to support one’s 
political position. This is a common problem with reform that aims to 
promote bureaucratic reform and legality as a public good, as Barbara Geddes 
has argued; ‘administrative competence is an especially costly form of 
collective good to most politicians because … politicians in unreformed 
systems rely on access to state resources to build support organizations, and 
administrative reform threatens such access.’38 Circumstances reinforced the 
perception of the dangers of reform. The conflict that the changes proposed by 
Medvedev and INSOR would have involved would have been difficult to bear 
during an economic downturn such as Russia experienced from the autumn of 
2008 onwards. Once the economic downturn had bottomed out, as it did from 
the middle of 2009, and growth was restored to the economy from 2010, it 
was too late in the electoral cycle to take chances such as Medvedev/INSOR 
proposed. Politically, therefore, Russia stagnated even as its economy 
recovered in 2010-2011. There were some small efforts at pushing the 
modernization agenda forward such as the removal of state officials from the 
boards of state companies, but these were half-hearted.  
Political stagnation meant that Putin and Medvedev were unable to 
deal with the growing protests that came with economic downturn and the 
exposure of the contradictions of Russian neo-patrimonialism that the tandem 
produced. Protest often focussed on the discrepancy that has to exist in a neo-
patrimonial system between formal rules and informal practices. Protests 
grew from 2009 onwards, both because of economic slowdown (for example, 
the Vladivostok car dealers protests of 2010), and over political issues (for 
example, the Strategiya-31 movement – Strategy-31 – which protested for the 
right to protest under Art.31 of the Russian Constitution; they demonstrated 
illegally on the 31st of the month), and over local environmental issues that 
became politicised (for example, the Khimki Forest Defense Movement). 
Finally, there were popular protests, most famously the Obshchestvo sinyikh 
vedyorok (Society of the Blue Buckets, who protested official traffic lanes and 
congestion) that were aimed at elite privilege and at the failure of the state to 
deal with specific problems. Some of protests, such as the Pikalyovo 	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demonstrations against a factory closure in 2009, could be resolved by Putin’s 
personal intervention, but this was not a strategy for dealing with the larger 
issues that were surfacing with Russian neo-patrimonialism. Even as the 
economy recovered the relationship between state and regime needed to be 
addressed. The weak response from Putin and the political system generally to 
the Medvedev/INSOR agenda meant that there was little chance of moving to 
democratic developmentalism. Moving towards authoritarian 
developmentalism was a non-starter for the same reasons. Diverting resources 
from consumption to investment ran the same risks of creating divisions over 
rent distribution within both the polity and society as the Medvedev/INSOR 
modernization route out of neo-patrimonialism.  Increasing the wealth and 
autonomy of elite groups and members, in effect a move towards greater 
patrimonial capitalism, was equally a non-starter. The problem, as protests 
were highlighting, was weak state functionality so that a further decrease in 
that functionality would have been like fighting a fire by pouring on gasoline. 
One of the reasons that Russians did not universally applaud economic 
recovery after 2009 was the perception that anti-crisis measures had overly 
favoured Russian economic elites, at least in their initial stages. Further 
concessions to them and compromise with them was politically dangerous, 
and anyway was not necessary; they had little room to manoeuvre and support 
the opposition due to the changes in the political system that Putin had 
introduced in 2000-2008. 
This left only one option for dealing with crisis: restore Putin’s 
dominance of the political system unequivocally and find a means of 
rebuilding trust in the state despite its continued lack of functionality. This 
could be done partly by Putin’s return to office and the recombination of his 
charismatic authority with formal power. Charisma alone, however, was not 
likely to be enough given the damage that the downturn in the economy and 
protest were doing to Putin’s prestige. Moreover, the decision to return Putin 
to office was not a straightforward one. Putin and Medvedev prevaricated – 
publically at least – in 2010 and the first ten months of 2011 over what was 
going to happen in the 2012 presidential elections. This just compounded 
uncertainty about the direction in which Russian neo-patrimonialism would 
develop and made it harder to take difficult political and economic choices 
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such as would have been necessary to move to some form of developmental 
state. Uncertainty over what direction Russian neo-patrimonialism might take 
became confused with the issue of a second-term for Medvedev, and over what 
vehicles electoral activity would be organized through, and by whom. The 
creation of the All-Russian People’s Front at the start of May 2011 at Putin’s 
behest seemed to point to Putin’s return to office and the extension of United 
Russia as an organization through the Front, which was supposed to ally 
United Russia with civil society, business and labour organizations. But then 
Medvedev took over as chair of United Russia at its XIII congress at the end of 
March. This indecisiveness and to-ing and fro-ing over the succession went 
until Putin’s September 2011 announcement that he would run for the 
presidency, not Medvedev. 
Once the decision to replace Medvedev was made, the ‘cultural turn’, 
and the ‘culture wars’ that came with it, could develop. As we saw above, this 
had electoral benefits for Putin as the ‘cultural turn’ talked to a core electorate. 
But the ‘cultural turn’ is more than this; it was not something that could be set 
aside once the elections had run their course because it was more than a 
simple tool to rally voters to the flag.  The ‘cultural turn’ and the promotion of 
a conservative traditionalism have powerful stabilizing properties for Russian 
neo-patrimonialism. The ‘cultural turn’ works on several levels. It does this 
through creating a rhetoric of reaction in Russian politics. This rhetoric is 
Putin’s, he is the chief articulator of the turn. This makes something of his 
charisma for a new presidential term(s?). The crisis of 2008-2012 showed the 
limits of the old neo-patrimonial system and Putin could not go back and 
reforge the successes of the past; a new presidential term had to have a goal 
and the ‘cultural turn’ provided this. Putin’s spokesman, Putin’s spokesman, 
Dmitri Peskov, speaking to Russian television just after Putin’s re-election, 
summed this up: according to Peskov, Putin’s ‘first [presidential] term was 
resuscitation of the country, the second term was rehabilitation, and now 
begins physical and spiritual development of the country, its economy and its 
every single region.’39 The nature of the rhetoric of reaction is, however, that it 
is almost without content. It has created a statist project for Russia without 	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actually doing anything about the state as a bureaucratic order that should be 
functional. Partly this is because the ‘cultural turn’ is very vague. Putin is not 
someone much given to speaking about ideology. One of the other statements 
in his millennial document is that he does not believe that Russia should have 
a ‘state ideology’. He has been consistent in eschewing the idea that his 
pronouncements amount to an ideology and on what the sources are behind 
his thinking. Putin is only not vague in his cultural conservatism in one area: 
his critique of the dangers of action. This is what creates Putin’s rhetoric of 
reaction and makes it work as a means of stabilizing neo-patrimonial politics 
in Russia. 
 
Putin’s rhetoric of reaction 
 
According to Albert Hirschman, reactionary rhetoric takes one of three forms: 
perversity, futility, and jeopardy. Each of these argues against change rather 
than for some particular course of action. Reactionary rhetoric is designed to 
limit the field of possible political action and agency, to promote the 
continued existence of a state of affairs. To this end reactionary rhetoric serves 
up warnings about the outcomes of change, whether that change be 
revolutionary or reformist. Each form of reactionary rhetoric does this in a 
particular way, although they can be used in conjunctions with one another. 
The perversity argument states that an attempt at change will produce the 
opposite result to what was intended. The classic arguments that Hirschman 
analyses to show this are the arguments about the French revolution that 
point out that the attempt by revolutionaries to create ‘fraternity, liberty and 
equality’ ended up producing the opposite, dictatorship, so that it would have 
been better to leave French society slowly evolve, as many claim it was doing 
before the revolution, to something better. The futility argument argues that 
change is pointless not because it will not actually change anything at all of 
any substance. The example that Hirschman uses here are the arguments 
against the extension of political rights, which some claimed, is futile because 
of the tendency of societies to be dominated elites. Extending democratic 
rights, the argument goes, does not change this, politics is still dominated by 
elites, so rights are meaningless. The third argument proposes that change is 
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not futile but actively dangerous since it puts in jeopardy something that is 
valuable. The argument that Hirschman uses to illustrate this type of 
reactionary rhetoric are the criticisms that have been made of the extension of 
social welfare rights in democratic societies, which it has been argued, imperil 
economic and democratic vitality by distorting labour markets and the 
relationship of citizens to political authorities by making them dependent on 
power for welfare.40  
Putin, in a novel fashion, uses all three of these arguments. The starting 
point is that for Putin, Russia is unique as a civilization.41 There is nothing 
particularly striking about this claim, it is an empirical one: all countries are to 
some degree unique because of their particular histories, geographies and 
experiences. However, Russia is different to other places, according to Putin, 
because of the character of its civilization and because of the extent to which it 
has kept this civilization in recent times. Russia, for Putin, is a ‘state-
civilization’.42 By this he means that there is a close alignment between 
Russia’s ability to exist as a state and as a civilization; each depends on the 
other; without the state there would be no civilization, and without the 
civilization, there would be no state.43 The strength of a state is a function of 
how strong its civilizational identity is. This identity is a resource, one that 
needs to be protected so that the state can survive, and one that the state has 
to protect so that it can survive. The character of this civilization is essentially 
a religious one, but it is not totally determined by one religious denomination. 
Although the main source of Russian civilization is Christian Russian 
orthodoxy, something that Russia shares with Belarus and Ukraine, Russia’s 
‘state-civilization’ is not underpinned by Orthodoxy alone. Russia’s ‘state-
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civilization’ is formed because Orthodoxy and the other religions that are 
present inside the territory of Russia are joined by a common concern for the 
preservation of traditional moral values. This enables Russia to exist as a 
multi-faith society and a multi-ethnic society. The dominant values are 
Orthodox and Russian, but the other faiths fit with Orthodoxy and coexist 
with it to support the state. There is no room or need for them to propose state 
missions of their own in the form of separatist projects, because their core 
moral concerns are already addressed in the larger Russian Orthodox faith. As 
a result they are subsumed in the greater Russian ‘state-civilization’ and have 
not (and cannot and should not) develop state-bearing cultures of their own.  
The task of the Russian state is to protect Russia as a ‘state-civilization’. 
This Putin argues has never been more necessary than at the present. Other 
‘state-civilizations’ are giving up and debasing the traditional values that they 
once had. This is because of globalization, on the one hand, particularly 
cultural globalization, and because of their abandonment of traditional values. 
The key danger is the latter. Putin acknowledges that there has always been 
competition between states, of which globalization is just the latest form. 
However, globalization is different to previous types of competition because it 
is not just military or economic, it is also ideational. Population movements 
and the attempts to deal with them have given rise to multiculturalism. This 
multiculturalism is not based on any organic intellectual foundations like the 
mixture of religions that underpin Russia’s ‘state-civilization’. It is instead 
founded on abstract principles, like the idea of ‘tolerance’, which Putin argues, 
are ‘neutered and barren’. As a result, Putin argued in his address to the 
Federal Assembly in 2013:  
Today, many nations are revising their moral values and ethical 
norms, eroding ethnic traditions and differences between peoples and 
cultures. Society is now required not only to recognise everyone’s right 
to the freedom of consciousness, political views and privacy, but also 
to accept without question the equality of good and evil, strange as it 
seems, concepts that are opposite in meaning. This destruction of 
traditional values from above not only leads to negative consequences 
for society, but is also essentially anti-democratic, since it is carried 
out on the basis of abstract, speculative ideas, contrary to the will of 
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the majority, which does not accept the changes occurring or the 
proposed revision of values.44 
 
The last part of this quote is important. Putin is not rejecting ‘democracy’, but 
claiming to be its truest representative, articulating a truly populist position 
that is more in tune with societal aspirations than anything that can be 
uncovered through an electoral system, especially where elections, such as to 
parliaments, are designed to secure representation of sectional interests, i.e., 
fractions of the people that destroy representation of the majority. Putin is 
putting himself above such elections as President and representative of the 
majority, which, of course, is opposed to the erosion of traditional values. In 
this way Putin sets his version of democracy against the forms of democracy 
that are most common in Europe. Not surprisingly Putin also argues that the 
erosion of traditional values is especially advanced in Europe, which thereby 
stands in stark contrast to Russia.45  
 Putin’s view of Russia underpins his rhetoric of reaction in several 
ways. First, it frames how he sees past attempts at changing Russia. These 
attempts at change are framed through the lenses of both perversity and 
futility. The perversity argument is deployed to argue that previous attempts 
at change had unintended consequences so that they led to the opposite of 
what they proposed. Such change occurs when the hold of the civilizational 
identity that underpins the state is weakened. The metaphor that Putin uses is 
a medical one. ‘State-civilization’ is a form of immunity that keeps at bay 
revolutionary and reformist ideas. These  ‘… are always some kinds of bacillus 
that destroy this social or public organism.’ When ‘immunity decreases … 
millions already believe that things cannot get any worse, let's change 
something at any price, we shall destroy everything there, "we shall build our 
new world, and he who was nothing will become everything.” In fact, it did not 
happen as one wished it to be.’ Change meant that the ‘loss of the state self-
identity both during the Russian Empire’s collapse and during the Soviet 	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Union’s breakup was disastrous and destructive’. The chief culprit in this was 
the elite, in particular the intelligentsia, which was keen to ‘emphasise their 
civility, their level of education; people always want to be guided by the best 
examples’. The result was copying from abroad, which was tantamount to 
opposing Russia (this Putin neatly justifies with a quote from Pushkin to 
prove that he is not anti-intellectual just anti-intelligentsia).46 Equally 
dangerous and perverse is the threat of ‘mono-ethnicism’, which for Putin is 
any attempt to put the interests of ethnic Russians above those of the broad 
set of inter-religious traditional values that join different ethnicities and 
religionists in the Russian ‘state-civilization’. Putting one nationality above 
another, Putin argues, ‘was the formula used by those who paved the way to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union’, and stands in contrast to the longer-standing 
cultural values of Russia that have been reaffirmed over the centuries. 
Promoting ‘Russia first’ simply opens up the floodgates to competing claims to 
sovereignty as it did when the USSR collapsed, and is anyway a Western idea 
too since it is based on ‘the notorious concept of self-determination, a slogan 
used by all kinds of politicians who have fought for power and geopolitical 
dividends, from Vladimir Lenin to Woodrow Wilson’.47 There is what Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have called a logic of equivalence at work here. 
Although many nationalists and liberals would see themselves as poles apart 
in Russian politics, they are, Putin argues, essentially the same. They both 
work from abstractions and as a result the differences between them ‘cancel 
each other out insofar as they are used to express something identical 
underlying them all’, namely their opposition to the true values of Russia’s 
‘state-civilization’.48 
 The outcomes of change driven by the intelligentsia (and by them Putin 
seems to be referring more or less exclusively to liberals and to the 
cosmopolitan left) and by nationalists are not simply perverse, they are also 
futile. Although previous reform and revolutionary changes have been 
destructive, as when people’s natural immunity was reduced at the end of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Putin, V.V. ‘Interv’yu Pervomu kanalu i agentsvu Assoshieyted Press. 4 sentyabrya 2013 
goda’, http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/19143, accessed 7 September 2013. 
47 Putin, ‘Russia: the ethnicity issue’.  
48 Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe Hegemony and socialist strategy. Towards a radical democratic 
politics, London, Verso, 1985, p.127. 
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Tsarism and during the collapse of the USSR, the change that was wrought 
after these collapses was in the end incomplete because of futility. Putin’s 
claim that change has been futile is implicit; the futility of change is not 
automatic for Putin as it is in the reactionary rhetoric that Hirschman 
analysed. This is a rhetorical trick that Putin plays, but it is an important one. 
If change were futile because it can never overcome Russian traditionalism 
then it would not be existentially dangerous; change could happen and those 
bits of it that fit with traditional values would endure and others would be of 
no account. Moreover, if change were not futile then it would have already 
altered Russia, changing its ‘state-civilization’ into something else, something 
not ‘traditional’ and organic, but a pastiche of old and new. So, Putin implies, 
change has been futile in the past because Russia still exists, but at the same 
time change is dangerous because there is no longer any guarantees that 
change will be rendered futile by the resurgence of traditional values. There is, 
for Putin, a difference between the past and the present. In the past, 
competition between cultures was not as intense as it is now and it did not so 
clearly involve the transfer of ‘ways of life’ from one place to another. The 
signs of this for Putin are many: ‘global development is becoming increasingly 
contradictory and dynamic’; the very idea of ‘soft power’ ‘implies a matrix of 
tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals by exerting information and 
other levers of influence’ that uses ‘illegal instruments’ ‘to manipulate the 
public and to conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign 
countries’.49 Globally, the result for Putin is that ‘supposedly more progressive 
development models’ have been pushed on countries and have, as after the 
Arab Spring, brought chaos and bloodshed.50 This theme was, of course, 
repeated in the wake of the Maidan demonstrations in Kiev, alongside the idea 
that Ukraine was a part of the wider Russian ‘state-civilization’, an idea that 
Putin had promulgated before the demonstrations that had lead to the fall of 
the Yanukovych regime, and that was central to the Eurasian Union project.51  	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According to Putin, the ‘future Eurasian Economic Union, which we have declared and which 
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 Since change can no longer be relied on to become futile it threatens 
jeopardy; it will damage rather than restore the Russian state.  The cultural 
ties that bind Russian people are, for Putin, weaker than they have been 
before, a fact that he believes is shown by Russian’s tolerance of ‘corruption, 
brazen greed, manifestations of extremism and offensive behaviour’.52 
Traditional values can no loner be relied on to renew themselves as they have 
in the past, because they are not a finite resource in the current global order. 
This Putin has argued on several occasions, is the lesson that has been learnt 
over the course of Russia’s post-communist history and as Russia has dealt 
with competition from abroad: ‘we eventually came to the conclusion that 
there are no inexhaustible resources and we must always maintain them. The 
most important resource for Russia’s strength and future is our historical 
memory.’53 The fact that the ‘Russian people are state-builders, as evidenced 
by the existence of Russia’ remains true, but the ‘cultural code’ that has 
historically underpinned state building ‘has been attacked ever more often 
over the past few years; hostile forces have been trying to break it, and yet, it 
has survived. It needs to be supported, strengthened and protected’.54  
 From this brief survey we can see that Putin’s ‘cultural turn’ towards 
conservative traditional values is almost relentlessly negative. The only 
positive thing that Putin recommends is the preservation of Russian culture 
and its increased celebration and use in education. This has led, amongst 
other things, to calls for new school texts, the establishment of a Military-
Historical Society with the involvement of the Minister for Culture, more 
celebration of Russian feats of arms, including new war memorials and more 
prominence given to Russia’s part in World War I, the recreation of the Gotov 
k trudy i oborone (Ready for labour and defence, a physical and ideological 
fitness programme originally launched by Stalin in 1931, that ran throughout 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
we have discussed extensively as of late, is not just a collection of mutually beneficial 
agreements. The Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the 
historical Eurasian space in a new century and in a new world. Eurasian integration is a 
chance for the entire post-Soviet space to become an independent centre for global 
development, rather than remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia.’ Putin, ‘Zasedanie … 
kluba “Valdai”’. 
52 Putin. V.V. ‘Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu. 12 dekabrya 2012 goda’, 
http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/17118, accessed 7 January 2013. 
53 Putin. V.V. ‘Vstrecha s uchastnikami uchreditel’nogo s’’ezda Rossiiskogo voenno-
istoricheskogo obshchestva. 14 marta 2013 goda’, http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/17677, 
accessed 20 January 2014. 
54 Putin, ‘Russia: the ethnicity issue’. 
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the rest of the Soviet period) programme in March 2014, as well as the 
persecution of those who are clearly defined as not part of Putin’s community 
of values: the ‘disparate traitors’ of the ‘fifth column’, the liberal intelligentsia 
with their tendency to cringe culturally before the West, ethno-nationalists, 
and, of course, most famously in the West, Russia’s LGBT community. But 
ultimately, the result of the ‘cultural turn’ is symbolic, rather than 
administrative, politics. The organization of the state is not brought into 
question by the ‘cultural turn’ and policy, outside education and physical 
fitness, and ‘lifestyle’ politics, is barely mentioned within the frame of the 
‘cultural turn. Negativity is key to the support that the ‘cultural turn’ gives to 
Russian neo-patrimonialism. It denies political agency to any group or 
interest that might seek one of the exits to neo-patrimonialism. Liberal or 
nationalist projects are perverse and may lead to the final eradication of the 
Russian state as the embodiment of a particular ‘civilization’. All that stands 
between this final eradication of Russia as a ‘state-civilization’ is Putin and the 
link that he has to the people who share his traditional values. The end result 
of the ‘cultural turn’ is thus that Putin’s charisma is revitalised by its 
association with a particular view of what Russia is and should be, and what it 
should be protected against. Moreover, there can be no encroachment on this 
charisma by appeals to state reform through the development of legal-
rationality. The functionality of the state cannot to be measured simply in 
material terms anymore, but in spiritual ones. The yardstick of the Russian 
state’s success has gone back to Fyodor Tyutchev’s famous lines: 
Умом Россию не понять,        Russia cannot be understood by reason, 
Аршином общим не измерить:       No standard gauge can measure her: 
У ней особенная стать —        She stands alone, unique -  
В Россию можно только верить.           One can only believe in Russia. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Putin’s ‘cultural turn’ and the culture wars that have resulted from it have 
stabilised Russian neo-patrimonialism. Events in Ukraine, and the way that 
they talk to Russian nationalism, have helped this along. The longer-term – 
although how long this longer-term will be no one knows – prospects of this 
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are not, however good. Putin, to paraphrase Alexander Gerschenkron’s 
critique of nineteenth century Russian populism, has raised ‘the paradoxical 
claim that the preservation of the old rather than the easy adoption of the new 
constitute[s] the “advantages of backwardness”. The result [is] a tragic 
surrender of realism to utopia.’55 In Putin’s case this is because the new is 
hard to adopt, but overall Gerschenkron’s criticism holds. The increased 
reliance on charisma and its association with the rhetoric of reaction may 
legitimate Putin’s rule and stabilise Russian neo-patrimonialism by limiting 
the range of action that be taken to get out of it. This, however, comes at a 
cost. The surrender of realism to the idea that Russia is protecting a mythical 
civilization, its new utopia, means that governance will remain stuck in the rut 
that it has been in for the last twenty years. In the absence of an agenda for 
change the Russian neo-patrimonial system will not collapse, but neither will 
it develop. It is no surprise that one of the other themes of Russian politics 
over the last few years has been the idea of a return to zastoi, stagnation, the 
name that Gorbachev gave the sclerosis that overtook the USSR under 
Brezhnev.56 The motor of zastoi was something remarkably like the ideas that 
underpin the ‘cultural turn’; then the idea was that the Soviet way of life was 
best, an alternative modernity to that of the West, and that this needed to be 
protected and extended through patriotic education. The result, however, was 
neo-traditionalism and the extension of corruption through routinization. In 
the Brezhnev era, this routinization occurred ‘when charismatic organizational 
leadership c[ould] no longer identify a compelling transformation task, define 
it strategically (not merely symbolically), and mobilise significant sections of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Gerschenkron, A. Continuity in history and other essays, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 
1968, p.455. 
56 There are too many sources on this to count. For a sample see: Buehller, P. ‘Putin’s 
Brezhnev Syndrome’, Project Syndicate, 3 December 2011,http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/putin-s-brezhnev-syndrome, accessed 7 December 2011; 
Pis’mennaya, E. ‘Zastoi Putina’, Vedomosti, 10 August 2012, 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/290901/zastoj_putina, accessed 15 September 
2012; Baev, Pavel K. ‘Putin in Denial About Economic Stagnation, and in a Rage About Arctic 
Sovereignty’,Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2013, 10, 178, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41455#.U07Ib
-ZdWaN, accessed 20 February 2014; Chelnokov, A.S. Putinskii Zastoi: Novoe Politbiuro 
Kremlia, Moscow, Yauza-press, 2013. 	  
	   37	  
the organization around both task and strategy.’57 Putin may, for now, have 
found a task and a strategy in Ukraine and in the foreign policy problems that 
the events in Ukraine create. But the struggle for Ukraine won’t last forever. 
When it ends Putin will have to deal with Russia’s problems at more than the 
symbolic level of the ‘cultural turn.’ 
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